Privileging Indigeneity

Anthea Fraser Gupta, University of Leeds

Ideology of Language Planning

It is inevitable that in any nation, organisation, or even family, some languages will be privileged at the expense of others. This privileging is typically based on a mixture of functionality and ideology. Those of us who analyse these decisions bring to the analysis our ideologies, which may in turn feed into the development of new or old ideologies. My first paper in the field of language planning (Gupta 1985) was an exploration of the link between policies and politics -- what was the goal of a language planning decision? what was its likely outcome? In more recent papers and presentations (1997, 2001a, 2001b) I have taken issue with some of the arguments of the Language Rights Movement, mostly in connection with the promotion of native languages in education. I have argued that the concept of native language is not a useful one in many multilingual settings, and that traditions of certain languages being associated with education in some places need to be respected. I have consistently argued that English is not the property of certain locations (such just those where its traditional native speakers are), but a tool for the world. Today I am going to look at the ideology behind the identification of 'Regional or Minority Languages' in Europe.

My own linguistic ideology comes from a stance associated with Le Page's Acts of Identity (e.g. Le Page & Tabouret Keller 1980), which casts speakers as active creators of

their own sociolinguistic identity. I also believe that as a linguist I need to respect the dynamic of language change, which is part of the inevitable change in all human behaviour. In language, as in sexual behaviour, directing behaviour is not an exact science. A further motivating political ideology for me is my rejection of a genetically based nationalist ideology.

With unfortunately almost no reference to the sociolinguistic literature, De Swaan (2001) has examined the economics of language choice in way I find very powerful, discussing the 'political economy of language' (2001:18) and making clear how choice operates at the level of the individual as well as in wider contexts. The 'Q value' of a language is its communication value, a measure based on the 'prevalence' and 'centrality' in a certain 'constellation' (p33ff). The most *central* languages are those which have large numbers of speakers who are also competent in some other language(s), and which are therefore highly *connected*. De Swaan shows how individuals make choices about language learning and use, defends their rights to choice, and shows how governmental decisions on language can only succeed if they correspond with Q-value. Prospective speakers compare language repertoires. The promotion of minority languages in locations with a strong majority language is hampered by their having low Q values of the languages. The fact, for example, that virtually all adult speakers of Scots Gaelic speak English, and that few speakers of Gaelic are non-native speakers, lowers the Q value of Gaelic. A lowered Q-value would also accrue 'insider' languages such as Scots, which it may be unacceptable for an outsider to attempt at all.

In some respects de Swaan's analysis revisits the ground covered many years ago by Greenberg (1956) and Stewart (1968) (Stewart is not quoted by de Swaan), though in a

more politically informed way. One thing I find especially valuable in De Swaan's analysis is his moral neutrality to language shift. People engaged in language shift may be portrayed as victims, perhaps seen as damaged or even morally reprehensible. I have argued elsewhere (Gupta 1997 etc.) that language shift, creolisation, and ethnic mixing are in themselves morally neutral, and not evidences of wrongful destruction, as is sometimes implied (or inferrable) in the discussion of language shift.

<u>Indigeneity</u>

In this paper I would like to turn to something that I find worrying in a number of guises, and that is the ideology that sees the 'indigenous' as more worthy than the imported. In the narrative of political and linguistic management indigeneity has been problematic. When the concepts of ecology are transposed to languages, languages fill the role of the organisms, and can be imagined as killers, as murder victims, or as sick. Mühlhäusler (1996:2) describes the metaphor as "particularly productive", although not without problems. The biological metaphor lends itself to considering some behaviours as natural and encouages a perspective that sees 'indigenous' or 'autochthonous' groups as a natural part of an ecology, and therefore as especially worthy of protection. Skutnabb-Kangas (2000:487ff) problematizes the concept of indigeneity and includes other non-dominant linguistic groups in her remit, but Nettle and Romaine (2000) seem to take the term as a given and do not define it. Indigeneity makes links between languages, genetic heritage, and territory.

Some cultures, such as Europe a millenium ago, or India 500 years ago, operate with a division between classical, learned languages on the one hand, and vernaculars on the other. The classical language (Latin, Sanskrit, Persian, for example) is typically spoken as

a native language by few or none but linked a literate elite across a wide geographical area. Vernaculars (English, Urdu, Bengali) flourish orally and develop writing systems -- in these contexts vernaculars are often the first languages of literacy. Not all vernaculars are equal -- de Swaan's Q-value operates here too, as some vernaculars do not develop writing systems, while others become regionally strong languages of education, and are used by non-native as well as native speakers.

Historically some of these classical languages had been languages of political or religious conquest. In a colonial setting the conquerors are typically seen as superior to the conquered -- and the 'natives' and their language as superior to that of the natives. In India, English, after Macaulay's famous Minute of 1835 (quoted by Mahmood 1895:50f) did not displace the vernaculars, but the classical languages. But a colonial situation is not static. As can be seen with Latin in Europe, a language can persist after the conquerors have left, to become both a culturally based language, and also, in many parts of Europe, developing into new vernaculars. This has already happened with English.

Nor are peoples static. Since humans left Africa people have moved from place to place. Some of these people adopted new languages as they moved. Others brought their languages to new places. All of us will have ancestors who were involved in language shift, whether that is known to us or too far back in our ancestry to have been transmitted. Historical linguists have long known that languages are not transmitted with DNA.

All of us have ancestors too who have been on both sides of the colonising and conquering shifts down the millenia. The 'indigenous' of a place can only ever be relative to the more recent arrivals. Sometimes, as with those who brought the Celtic languages to the British Isles, the process took place prehistorically. In the case of those who brought

the Germanic languages we know much more about the processes, while the introduction of the Romani languages is also in historical times. Furthermore, groups do not remain discrete, but merge, especially through marriage. Migration, language shift, and intermarriage are long established human practices. They have not stopped.

It is dangerous to solidify this fluidity into policy.

Myths of origin are valuable in the construction of national and ethnic identity, and these myths must have some point of contact with historical reality. Many nations operate with a myth of indigeneity, which is attached to people as well as to languages.

The myth of indigeneity served the British Empire well. In a colonial setting it is quite likely that indigeneity may be equated with inferiority, and that those seen as indigenous, or 'native' may be without power. But it is also possible to establish the indigenous as having rights to the territory which those not seen as indigenous do not have. This casts the indigenous as superior and is ethically no different from casting the indigenous as inferior. An ideology of indigeneity establishes certain groups of people (usually determined by ancestry) as having a particular link with a piece of territory. A language linked to these people is in turn seen as an indigenous language. It is perfectly possible that the superior rights of the indigenous and their inferior characteristics may be linked, as they were, for example, in colonial Malaya.

The myth of indigeneity was forcefully promoted by the colonial powers in a number of places. The eighteenth century British scholars who argued that the Malays were indigenous to the Malay peninsula and archipelago did not argue indigenousness on the basis of the greatest antiquity. Marsden (1812b:xix f) argues for Malay being regarded as indigenous to the region despite its not being the most ancient language of the region. He

compares the indigeneity of Malay in the Malay archipelago to the indigeneity of English in Great Britain (also displacing other languages), and concludes that as Malay has 'wide dissemination and high degree of antiquity .... In this restricted sense it is that we are justified in considering the main portion of the Malayan as original or indigenous.' Swettenham, former governor of the Straits Colony and High Commissioner for the Federated Malay States, takes the Malays indigeneity as given, and develops it into a justification of empire which positions the Chinese as co-developers of the colony with the British. Chinese 'energy and enterprise have made the Malay States what they are today, and it would be impossible to overstate the obligation which the Malay Government and people are under to these hard-working, capable, and law-abiding aliens' (Swettenham 1907:232). On the other hand the part played by the Malays 'was mainly negative' (p233).

> There are people who have no patience with the Malays, who say they are
> lazy and useless and have already received far too much consideration...
> They do not strive for riches, but they are probably as happy and
> contented as other people who regard life differently, and it is
> questionable whether we should deserve their thanks if we could teach
> them the tireless energy, the self-denying frugality of the Chinese... You
> cannot make people virtuous by Act of Parliament, and you cannot graft
> the Chinese nature on to the Malay body. The Malays are 'the people of
> the country'; we went to the Malay States for their benefit, and we have
> somehow managed to give them an independence, a happiness and a
> prosperity which they never knew before; and while it is not Malays alone

who have thus benefitted, but all classes and nationalities, the credit is due

to a few British officers who strove ceaselessly for that object which Lord

Curzon puts first amongst the lessons taught him by Eastern

administration. (Swettenham 1907:304f).

This centrality of the Malays is the central theme of Swettenham's life work, and he

returns to it in the closing words of his book, arguing that 'time will not change the

Malay character or alter the fact that the Malays are 'the people of the country' whose

confidence we have gained by making their interests our first consideration.'

Shamsul (1997) discusses the way in which ethnographic studies by the colonists were

made to serve the requirements of colonialism , and emphasises how seldom the social

categories that emerged from this ethnography are questioned today:

suffices to say that the social category 'Malay' (for that matter Chinese,

Indian, Kadazan and Iban, too) has always been used, first, as something

given and taken-for-granted and, second, in analytical terms, as tool for

analysis used automatically in pair or cluster with other social categories,

such as Chinese or Indian. This in turn has resulted in 'essentialising' the

Malays (and simultaneously the Chinese, Indian and Others, too) giving it

a set of ideal-typical attributes for the sake of analysis thus encouraging

the obviously simplistic perception that Malays as a social group is a

homogenous one. What seems to be an analytical convenience, in fact

'orientalist' in spirit, has developed into a 'scientific approach' thus

'Malay' or 'Malayness' as a social category has never been problematised

or perceived as something constructed, invented, artificial despite the fact

that 'what it means' and 'what it is' have always been altered, redefined,

reconstituted and the boundaries expanded according to specific social-

historical circumstances, especially after the introduction of colonial

'racism' and 'racial category' into the realm of authority-defined and

everyday-defined social reality in British Malaya....

The myth of the indigenous Malay was used to legitimise colonial rule; and in modern

Malaysia is is used to legitimise the bumiputra policy (related concepts also motivate

political discourse in Brunei, see for example Gunn 1997). In modern Singapore

indigeneity serves a national myth of striving meritocrats building on nothing to create a

prosperous city, but also feeds into policies and discourse based on ethnic stereotyping.

Policies of privileging indigeneity have given separate treatment to groups identified as

indigenous in many places, including Fiji, Malaysia and Israel. In all cases the priviliging

of the group has negative consequences on members of other groups, even if they know

the language which is privileged. Privileging *a language*, by contrast, does not confer an

exclusive advantage on those who speak it, or who comes from its congruent ethnic

group, unless those who do not speak a priviliged language are denied access to its

learning (as is the case in modern Singapore, where those who are not ethnic Chinese are

denied access, in the school system, to both Chinese and Japanese). So the privileging of

Malay in Malaysia does not disadvantage those who are not Malay, as access to learning

Malay is facilitated for all.

In modern Malaysia, there is constant negotiation about which privileges are to be given

to those groups regarded as 'bumiputera' -- 'princes of the earth' / 'sons of the soil'.

There are also constant negotiations about which groups can so name themselves. Can the

mixed people that developed in Malaysia (for example, the Straits Chinese, and the Malacca Eurasians) call themselves indigenous (at the moment the answer is 'no')? Can those whose ancestors came from parts of the Malay Archipelago which are now in Indonesia (at the moment the answer is 'yes')? Israel identifies Jewish people as being entitled to a particular territory -- again there is the negotiation of definition of how 'Jewish' is to be defined. In both Fiji and Malaysia, part of the motivation for privileging 'indigenous' groups was a perception that they were economically disadvantaged compared to other groups, mostly the descendants of people from India and China. The other part was an assertion of power by a group who were in a narrow majority. In Israel too, there had been a history of oppression, though the oppressors were not the ancestors of those competing for the territory. All three examples, I would argue, show how the oppressed can take on the role of the oppressor.

The motivations for privileging indigeneity are many, and are often concerned with the redressing of previous oppression. Privileging a language is not enough to redress this history of oppression, as anyone can learn any language. So the group must be privileged. But if one group is privileged other groups are inevitably downgraded. It remains important to analyse the ideology of privileging indigeneity and to assess the ethics of any such privileging.

<u>Regional or Minority Languages in Europe</u>

The European Union defines languages in a hierarchy, which, as I have said, is inevitable in any organisation. At the top are the 11 official languages of the EU: Spanish, Danish, German, Greek, English, French, Italian, Dutch, Portuguese, Finnish and Swedish (the order in which they appear on the front cover, which, except for Español, is in the

alphabetical order of their names in themselves -- Spanish appears to be in the

alphabetical order of 'Castiliano'). Some of these are more official than others,

inevitably, but that issue is not relevant to my argument. These languages are official

languages of member states, but a member state with more than one official language can

be represented by only one of them, something which especially affects Luxembourg and

the Republic of Ireland: the 11 official languages, plus Irish and Luxembourgish were

promoted as languages to be learnt in the European Year of Languages (European

Community 2000). The runners up in the EU hierarchy are *Regional or Minority*

Languages:

> The customary definition of regional or minority language is that used in *European*
>
> *Charter for Regional or Minority Languages*, an international treaty supervised by
>
> the Council of Europe and adopted by many EU Member States, i.e. languages
>
> traditionally used by part of the population of a state that are not dialects of official
>
> languages of the state, languages of migrants or artificially created languages.
>
> *Regional and minority languages of the European Union*

This is a rewording of the Charter. In the Charter itself the key words which are vague in

meaning but not defined are 'traditionally' and 'migrant' -- the traditional use of a

language by nationals of a State is the crucial part of definition. It is not clear whether the

categories of 'migrant'and 'national of the state' are exclusive or overlapping terms

(*European Charter* 1992, Article 1). Potentially the European Charter's definitions could

be interpreted as including the languages of the descendants of recent migrants who have

are now nationals, if they then become 'traditional'. That is not how the Charter has been

interpreted -- rather the terms 'indigenous'and 'autochthonous' tend to be used to refer to the languages covered by the Charter, and the term 'immigrant' appears to include the native-born children and grandchildren of immigrants. In the UK the languages currently within the scope of the Charter (and ratified to some extent or another in the Charter) are Welsh, Scottish-Gaelic, Irish (in that order) and, to a lesser extent Scots and Ulster Scots, and (Council of Europe 2002).

The same indigenous / immigrant rhetoric is used by the Summer Institute of Linguistics *Ethnologue*:

> **Immigrant languages.** All languages spoken in a country are not necessarily listed as separate entries in the Ethnologue, especially immigrant languages which are still spoken in the country of origin and apparently have no significant dialect differences between the two locations. Known immigrant languages are listed in the introduction at the beginning of each country's listing, with population estimate if known. They are not included in the language statistics for that country. Information about immigrant languages is incomplete, and may be incorrect. Corrections are requested. Some languages listed in the country introductions may not be immigrant languages, but if the only unique thing known about a language in a given country is its presence, or its population, and it is listed with more information in another country, then it may also be listed only in the country introduction. This is especially true for the countries of the former USSR.
>
> ('Introduction')

Ethnologue can't possibly follow this definition through. So we find, for example, English listed as one of the languages of the US, Australia, and India. In the UK, which

Ethnologue currently identifies as having 12 living and 2 dead languages, the definition appears to have been in terms of a 'language' having originated in the UK. There are also problems of the definition of a 'language' – some of these languages aren't, by any reasonable definition, languages, but are partial lexicons, or dialects (Polari, Yinglish). Yinglish, by the way, is described as 'a language of USA', which suggests it's an immigrant language (from the US?). Why should it be there and not Hinglish, London Jamaican / Patwa? (known in Ethnologue as 'Southwestern Caribbean Creole English'). If Polari and Traveller Scottish are UK languages, why isn't Shelta (because it's 'a language of Ireland' – but Ethnologue itself claims 30,000 speakers of it in the UK and 6,000 in Ireland!). Languages spoken by large numbers of UK nationals are classed as immigrant languages (e.g. Gujarati, Greek).

Just as in Malaysia groups lobby for the right to be indigenous, so in the EU languages lobby for the right to be identified as a 'Regional or Minority' language. In the UK Cornish has recently argued for its acceptance as a recognised language for minority status, and BSL is another potential candidate. But Gujarati and Greek can make no such case.

Many of the recognised Regional and Minority Languages have been subject to considerable attack from speakers of the majority languages that surround them and were often the subject of concerted efforts at eradication. They have typically lost speakers as a process of language shift, as speakers make the kind of pragmatic decisions discussed by se Swaan. However, those who speak the minority languages, or who are the descendants of speakers of them, are not necessarily *now* among the most underprivileged members of society. The privileging of these languages is not based on a need to ameliorate an

underprivileged *group of people*, but on a sense of the cultural and affective importance of the *languages.* Ó Riagáin (2001:45) also makes the point that the Charter is carefully addressed at languages.

The rhetoric of indigeneity fits well with a recent trend in European politics to emphasise the European and the Judaeo-Christian tradition. This emphasis has shown electoral success in a number of European countries, and, in 2002, has seen the Netherlands attempting to impose a Dutch language policy on mosques, and a British Minister, David Blunkett, regretting that in 30% of Asian British families, English was not used at home, and advising Asian British parents to use English in the home in order to "overcome the schizophrenia which bedevils generational relationships" (Blunkett 2002). Ironically, However, in the prevalent discourse, both the 'indigenous'and 'immigrant' languages are typically not seen as suitable to be learnt by those who do not come from the community with which they associated. For example, Welsh (so important in Wales) cannot be taught as part of the National Curriculum in England, while languages such as Gujarati and Urdu, which *can* be part of the national curriculum (ages 11-16) are taught as 'Modern Foreign Languages' to a very small proportion of children, most of whom are native speakers of the languages.

I am sympathetic to efforts to redress the injustices and oppression of the past; to efforts to benefit underprivileged groups and to efforts to answer the linguistic needs of as many members of society as practicable. But these aims are not answered by making a distinction between 'indigenous' and 'migrant' languages, which can only be based entirely on a quasi-genetic territorial system that gives a high values to the indigenous. I

do not see that there can be any human rights or linguistic justification for prioritising groups defined as indigenous over groups not so defined.

Languages are Human Behaviours

We often have to work with the concept of 'a language'. But we should never forget that languages are not things -- they are aspects of human behaviour.

The ideology of indigeneity is often linked to notions of language preservation. Since the ecological analogy was made in the 1970s this metaphor has largely been used in connection with discussions of language death, and, increasingly, by those concerned with the loss of languages and language types, which is seen as analogical to the loss of species and genotypes. (Nettle & Romaine 2000, Skutnabb-Kangas 2000). Ways of (for example) classifying nouns may be seen as analagous to individual genes.

However, analogy is what this is. Languages are not tangible, like white-handed gibbons (and their genes) or like artefacts such the Ring of Brodgar or the Taj Mahal. Instantiations of languages exist concretely as text, and the rules that generated or could generate such texts can be inferred from text and from introspection. But languages are abstractions. We have no purely linguistic definition of 'a language' or 'a dialect' but must refer to cultural understandings for a usable concept. (We do have reasonable definitions of 'language', by comparison.)

Languages are human constructs of human behaviour. Some cultural behaviours carry moral values, e.g. mating practices, styles of dress. What practices are worth celebrating and what should we strive to eradicate? Candidates for the undesirable for me would include: exposure of infants, foot binding, sati, corporal and capital punishment. Other people have different evaluations. Few cultural behaviours seem to be universally seen as

ethically neutral (notions of manners in eating pehaps?). In language, however, most things seem ethically neutral. To what extent should their loss be deplored? Old English had a three way number distinction -- should it have been preserved? Does its loss matter? If no-one spoke a language with the middle voice would there have been a loss we should mourn? Would the world be a worse place without uvular fricatives? Should we decide what is worth preserving in behaviour (as opposed to in text)? Does that mean we have to try to influence language behaviour?

If the motivation of a language policy is to preserve a language, does that imply a purist tradition, which will prevent the appearance of new loanwords, or of regular linguistic change?

Like Mühlhäusler (1996:4f) I find it hard to see languages as anything other than social constructs, and I place human behaviour at the centre of language, rather than some external entity called 'a language' (Harris 1980, Le Page & Tabouret-Keller 1985). I do accept that it is sometimes necessary to talk about languages as named entities which have a social meaning a community, but I do not accept languages as things that need or deserve protection, though I can agree that there are circumstances in which groups of people may need to take action to enable themselves to continue performing language in a desired way. I certainly don't think that grammatical rules are things worthy of preservation. The axiom that languages change is an absolute.

Conclusion

The privileging of the indigenous is in the context of a discourse which analogises languages as part of an ecology. A biological ecosystem may work smoothly for the benefit of all in it, or may favour some organisms at the expense of others. But under any

real ecosystem lies a long history of conflict. When we come to humans, we need to question the ethics of the notion that some humans are a natural part of a physical territory, while other humans are an intrusion that disturbs the natural, like Himalayan balsam in Yorkshire or water hyacinths in Bengal. The ethics and the pragmatics of privileging some languages must be explored. If language shift and language change are both inevitable (perhaps natural?) aspects of human behaviour, then efforts to direct linguistic behaviour will benefit from exploiting the pragmatic and ideological motivations of the people whose behaviour they wish to change, but must also recognise the inevitability and moral neutrality of language shift and language change.

References

Blunkett, David. 2002. "What does citizenship mean today?" [Integration with Diversity: Globalisation and the Renewal of Democracy and Civil Society. In *Rethinking Britishness*. The Foreign Policy Centre.] Reference to preprint version of essay, 15 September 2002, *The Observer Comment* <www.observer.co.uk/comment/story/0,6903,792223,00.html> [accessed September 2002]

Council of Europe. 2002. "List of declarations made with respect to treaty no. 148. European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages". Complete chronology on: 06/10/02 <conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/cadreprincipal.htm>

de Swaan, Abram. 2001. *Words of the World*. Cambridge: Polity.

European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages. Strasbourg, 5.XL.1992. Council of Europe ETS no. 146 <conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/Treaties/Html/148.htm> [accessed August 2002]

European Communities. 2000. "A Community of Languages". <www.europarl.eu.int/language/default_en.htm> [accessed August 2002]

Greenberg, Joseph H. 1956. The measurement of linguistic diversity. *Language* 32: 109-115

Gunn, Geoffrey C.. 1997. L*anguage, Power and Ideology in Brunei Darussalam.* (Monographs in International Studies, Southeast Asia Series Number 99) Athens, Ohio: Ohio Centre for International Studies

Gupta, Anthea Fraser. 1985. "Language Status Planning in the ASEAN Countries". In ed. David Bradley *Pacific Linguistics: Papers in Southeast Asian Linguistics* No. 9. *Language policy, language planning and sociolinguistics in Southeast Asia*. 1-14

Gupta, Anthea Fraser. 1996. "English and Empire: teaching English in nineteenth century India". In eds. Neil M Mercer & Joan Swann *Learning English: Development and Diversity*. London/New York: Routledge/ Open University. 188-194

Gupta, Anthea Fraser. 1997. "When mother-tongue education is *not* preferred". *Journal of Multilingual and Multicultural Development* 18(6): 496-506

Gupta, Anthea Fraser. 2001a. (9 June) "English in the linguistic ecology of Singapore". *GNEL/MAVEN: The Cultural Politics of English as a World Language* (Freiburg) [on line version from <www.leeds.ac.uk/english/staff/afg>]

Gupta, Anthea Fraser. 2001b. "Realism and imagination in the teaching of English". *World Englishes* 20 (3): 365-381

Harris, Roy. 1980. *The language myth*. London: Duckworth

Le Page, R B & Andrée Tabouret-Keller. 1985. *Acts of Identity: creole-based approaches to language and ethnicity*. Cambridge: CUP

Mahmood, Syed. 1895. *A History of English Education in India*: its rise, development, progress, present condition and prospects being a narrative of the various phases of educational policy and measures adopted under British the rule from its beginning to the present period (1781 to 1893). Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental College, Aligarh: Aligarh

Marsden, William. (1812). *A Grammar of the Malayan Language*. London: Longman

Mühlhäusler, Peter. 1996. *Linguistic ecology: language change and linguistic imperialism in the Pacific regions.* London / New York: Routledge

Nettle, Daniel & Suzanne Romaine. 2000. *Vanishing voices: the extinction of the world's languages*. Oxford: OUP

Ó Riagáin, Dónall. 2001. "Language rights / human rights in Northern Ireland and the Role of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages". In eds. John M Kirk & Dónall P Ó Baoill. *Linguistic Politics*. Belfast: Cló Ollscoil na Banríona. 43-54

"Regional and minority languages of the European Union". European Communities 1995-2002 <europa.eu.int/comm/education/langmin/regmin.html> [accessed August 2002]

Shamsul Amri Baharudin. (1997). "Ethnicity, class or identity? In search of a new paradigm in Malaysian Studies". <www.gv.net.my/massa/shamsul.htm> [accessed July 1999]. [printed in *Akademika*, No. 53 (July): 33-59.]

SIL International. 2002. *Ethnologue: Languages of the World and a whole lot more*! <www.sil.org/ethnologue>

Skutnabb-Kangas, Tove. 2000. *Linguistic genocide in education – or worldwide diversity and human rights?* Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum

Stewart, William A. 1968. "A sociolinguistic typology for describing national multilingualism". In ed. Joshua A Fishman. *Readings in the Sociology of Language.* The Hague: Mouton. 531-545

Swettenham, Frank A. (1881). *Vocabulary of the English and Malay Languages*. Singapore: Government Printing Office

Swettenham, Frank. (1907). *British Malaya: An Account of the origin and progress of British Influence in Malaya*. London / New York: John Lane The Bodley Head